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Abstract
Email is undoubtedly the most used communications mechanism in society today. Within business
alone, it is estimated that 100 billion emails are sent and received daily across the world. While the
security and privacy of email has been of concern to enterprises and individuals for decades, this has
predominately been focused on protecting against malicious content in incoming emails and explicit
data exfiltration, rather than inadvertent leaks in outgoing emails. In this paper, we consider this
topic of outgoing emails and unintentional information leakage to better appreciate the security and
privacy concerns related to the simple activity of sending an email. Specifically, our research seeks
to investigate the extent to which potentially sensitive information could be leaked, in even blank
emails, by considering the metadata that is a natural part of email headers. Through findings from a
user-based experiment, we demonstrate that there is a noteworthy level of exposure of organisational
and personal identity information, much of which can be further used by an attacker for reconnais-
sance or develop a more targeted and sophisticated attack.
Keywords: Email analysis, Information leakage, Digital forensics, Unintentional information ex-
posure, Attack reconnaissance, Security and privacy risks
1 Introduction
For enterprises and individuals alike, the security and privacy of applications, systems and data is a
crucial concern. Recent reports and the spate of successful breaches (e.g., at Target, JP Morgan and
others [2, 11]) highlight the range of attacks being launched and the lengths to which criminals are willing
to go to achieve their malevolent goals. Although there are a plethora of techniques that can be levied to
compromise systems, one of the most prevalent is that of email. The classic case is that of an attacker
sending an email infected with malware to an individual, that once accessed, automatically propagates
to other individuals, possibly deleting or encrypting files or otherwise disrupting systems. The Melissa
Virus was one popular example of this [3]. Email as an attack vector has become so significant, that
it is now commonplace for organisations and email providers to conduct a range of security awareness
campaigns. Amongst other things, these campaigns emphasise simple yet key points, such as not opening
emails or attachments from unknown parties, and being vigilant for malicious individuals masquerading
as existing contacts.
While the security of incoming emails is a challenge well worth the research effort that has been
dedicated to it, we posit that there is another significant growing problem. This issue relates particularly
to outgoing emails and the leakage of potentially sensitive information via them. In this paper we focus
on this problem in an attempt to highlight the potential risks to the security and privacy of sensitive
information, and also to encourage further research in the area.
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As a motivating example, let us assume the case where an attacker poses as a potential customer and
sends an email to the sales department of a company requesting information on a product. The sales
team quickly responds remotely with brief details on the product, but indicates that they will provide
more detail once back in the office. The question of most interest to us here is: does the attacker gain any
information about the individual or their enterprise? From the content, we can easily infer that they are
not in the office, but can any other information be garnered? The answer to this question is a resounding
‘yes’, and the source of this information is the email headers.
Within every email, there is a set of metadata included called the email header. This metadata
contains information about the sender and receiver of the email, and the route (servers) that the email
traversed to go from sender to receiver [15, 18, 14, 16]. The problem with headers currently is the
amount of detail on the sender that is increasingly being added by applications and systems, with little
regard for the privacy implications. In the scenario above for instance, there is a very real chance that the
attacker could examine the header to determine: whether the message was sent from a smartphone and
if so, the type; the application used to send the email and its version number; the general location where
the email was sent from; the hostnames, IPs and mail agents of the email servers used by the company;
and even the security systems (inclusive of version details) implemented to protect the enterprise. This
information could be further used by an attacker to gather intelligence or to develop a more sophisticated
attack to target the individual or on their enterprise.
This paper concentrates on these security problems and aims to investigate the potential leakage of
sensitive information via email headers. There are several articles that hint at the fact that sensitive
information on the email sender can be discovered (e.g., [12, 19]) but little rigorous research on how, or
to what extent. To address this gap, we have adopted an experiment-based approach where we collect a
sample of emails from a range of enterprises and individuals and examine exactly what information is
leaked, and whether such information could be used by an attacker.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we examine the related work both
on email security and the wider problem of information leakage and system fingerprinting. Section 3
introduces the research goals and experimental method that we apply to conduct our investigation. Next,
Section 4 presents the findings from the experiment and discusses them in detail. We reflect on these
findings and the more substantial issues of information leakage and the risk it poses in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the report and presents avenues for future research.
2 Related Work
Various investigations have been conducted in the past which aim to study the content and headers of
email messages for abuse prevention (e.g., spam) and forensic analysis. In digital forensics for instance,
content analysis is often used to determine the true authorship of email messages. In de Vel et al., the
authors propose to use stylometry, the statistical analysis of variations in literary style between users [7].
Using machine learning, they were able to verify the authorship of the emails in a majority of cases. This
gives a general idea of the ability to identify and use basic email content to gain insight, and in this case,
useful attribution intelligence.
Considering email headers in particular, their use in the literature has been predominately on detect-
ing abuse such as spam [4], and on tracing emails. In Al-Zarouni [1] for example, a detailed discussion
is presented on how information in the email headers can be assessed to trace and ascertain the source
of an email, even when there might be attempts to deceive an investigator. This highlights an important
point with email headers, i.e., that they can, at least in part, be faked. Spam is one area where this tends
to occur often, and also specialised cases where cyber-criminals create synthetic headers to impersonate
a legitimate individual or user.
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Fortunately, a detailed analysis of an email header can often help to detect incongruent information
that might suggest a potentially fake email. For example, a mail-server which does not match the server
of the email address; or, to detect a suspicious amount of extra fields, or indeed, unusually few fields in
the header itself. A key point with respect to our current research, however, is the fact that although the
analysis of the headers can help to detect misuse, it can also lead to a security or privacy risk when used
for malevolent purposes (e.g., identifying the Internet Protocol (IP)addresses of an organisation’s email
servers for subsequent denial-of-service attacks).
A study on information leakage and its privacy implications pertinent to this discussion is that of
Eckersley [8]. In that work, the author demonstrates that Web browsers (via HTTP request headers) can
leak a variety of information on the browser itself and the computer used. This leakage is often to the
extent that the information could allow Internet users to be fingerprinted (uniquely identified) by Web
sites and even across multiple sites. The real privacy concern here is that all of this could occur without
a user’s knowledge or consent, and could be used for carefully targeted but unsolicited advertisements.
The leakage of information via HTTP request headers is a very similar problem to that faced today
with email headers. Unfortunately there has not been much research directed towards the latter, as
indicated in part by the length of our review, potentially because of greater attention on problems such
as spear-phishing and spam. While these are important issues, there is an increasing risk to individuals
and companies because of the leakage of information via email headers. As attackers continue to probe
enterprises for vulnerabilities, email headers provide a wealth of insight that could be used as a basis for
a range of attacks.
3 Research Aim and Approach
The aim of this research is to better understand the potential risk that individuals face based on emails that
they send. Specifically, we seek to investigate the extent to which email headers currently leak potentially
sensitive information about the sender and the company they work for, and how any information leaked
might be used for malicious ends. To address this question, our research approach has two main steps as
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Research approach adopted in our study
The first step is recruiting participants and collecting their email headers. For recruitment we have
chosen to use a convenience sample based on a set of enterprises known to the researchers. The main
reason for this is that it allows us to target particular industries, while also increasing likelihood of
participation in the study – such an experiment could be regarded as intrusive and therefore not palatable
to some enterprises. Once we recruit a set of willing participants, they are then asked to send a series of
emails (with no content) from their organisational email account to a specified email address.
In detail, we request that they send: (i) a fresh email from a computer mail client (e.g., Microsoft
Outlook or Thunderbird); (ii) a reply to an email (to be sent to us from their computer mail client); (iii)
a forwarded email (to be sent to us from their computer mail client); (iv) an email using the enterprise’s
Web-mail interface (using their browser of preference); and (v) an email from a mobile device (e.g.,
smartphone or tablet PC). This diversity in sources would allow us to gather data from a range of different
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media to also investigate whether there might be any difference in what is exposed. To provide us with
ground truth, participants were asked to include the type of email (i.e., (i)–(v)), the email client and the
device used, in the subject line of the email.
The second step in our experiment is the analysis of the email header. Our objective in this stage
is to examine the collected headers to determine exactly what information is exposed, how potentially
sensitive that information might be, and if possible, identify where and when such exposures are likely
to be found (e.g., whether it is specific to certain types of email client, device setups, or email servers).
The main tasks in this analysis are:
1) Decomposing each header into a list of header tags. Figure 2 shows an example of header output
and some tags commonly available, such as “Received”, “From”, “To”, “X-Mailer” and “Message-ID”.
Figure 2: An example of an email header’s tags (excerpt from [16])
2) Examining these tags individually for potentially sensitive information. For instance, tags such as
“X-Mailer” can reveal the software used to send an email (in Figure 2, it is Microsoft Outlook), and the
“Received” tag can indicate the type of email servers in use by the sender’s organisation (the example
in Figure 2 points to “Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.0)” which is a version of an SMTP server bundled
with Microsoft Exchange).
3) Investigating header tags for correlation to technologies. In detail, we seek to assess tags across
the full set of participants to determine whether there is any correlation in what is exposed based on
software, devices or email servers in use. In the simple case, if the sender is emailing from an Apple
device, are we more likely to find “Apple”, “Mac”, or “iOS” in header tags? This assessment also has
further implications in identifying the ‘naturalness’ of an email. For instance, if one knows that certain
tags will be present if a colleague (who always uses Outlook) is the true sender of an email, and yet such
tags are not present, this might indicate that the sender is not who they claim to be.
4 Experiment Findings and Discussion
4.1 Overview
In total, 75 individuals were contacted and of these, 50 agreed to participate. Overall, we gathered 225
emails from participants. There was a shortfall in the volume of email collected because some individuals
did not set up work email on their smartphones (7 participants), others did not use a dedicated desktop
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Information inferred No. (%) of emails
Device IP 79 (35%)
- Device IP - internal (using ‘Received’) 56 (25%)
- Device IP - internal (using ‘x-originating-ip’) 20 (9%)
- Device IP - public (using ‘Received’) 3 (1%)
Device manufacturer (using ‘Message-ID’, ‘MIME-Version’) 23 (10%)
Device name (using ‘Received’ and ‘helo=’) 3 (1%)
Device operating system 54 (24%)
- Device operating system (using ‘Message-ID’) 14 (6%)
- Device operating system (using ‘MIME-Version’) 18 (8%)
- Device operating system (using ‘Received’) 1 (1%)
- Device operating system (using ‘User Agent’) 21 (9%)
Device type 61 (27%)
- Device type (pc — mobile)* [via ‘Device OS’] 48 (21%)
- Device type (pc — mobile)* [via ‘Email client software’] 45 (20%)
Email client software 64 (28%)
- Email client software (using ‘User Agent’) 26 (12%)
- Email client software (using ‘X-Mailer’) 38 (17%)
Email client type 72 (32%)
- Email client type (software — browser) (using ‘Received’) 6 (3%)
- Email client type (software — browser)* [via ‘Client software’] 51 (23%)
- Email client type (software — browser)* [via ‘Device OS’] 51 (23%)
Email server(s) hostname (using ‘Received’) 225 (100%)
Email server(s) IP (external or internal) (using ‘Received’) 225 (100%)
Email server(s) IPV6 capable* [via ‘Email server IP’] 47 (21%)
Email server(s) software and protocols <e.g. ‘Microsoft SMTP Server’, ‘Exim’, ‘MAPI’, ‘ESMTP’> 225 (100%)
Email server(s) software (security) (using ‘X-’ eg IronPort, XDCC) 58 (26%)
Email server(s) software for authentication/encryption use <e.g. ‘SMTPSA’, ‘TLS’> 97 (43%)
Email service(s) outsourced <e.g. to Google or Microsoft> 57 (25%)
Employer address 170 (76%)
- Employer address* [via ‘Email server IP/name’] 156 (69%)
- Employer address* [via ‘Employer public IP’] 36 (16%)
Employer name 175 (78%)
- Employer name* [via ‘Email server IP’] 156 (69%)
- Employer name* [via ‘Employer public IP’] 44 (20%)
- Employer name (using ‘Organisation’) 9 (4%)
Employer public IP (potentially company servers) (using ‘x-originating-ip’) 49 (22%)
Internal network IP configuration* [via ‘Device IP’/‘Server IP’/‘NATs/DHCPs/WLANs’] 83 (37%)
Internal network NATs/DHCPs/WLANs info <e.g. ‘WLAN’ names> 23 (10%)
Internal username (using ‘X-..-Username’, ‘X-Authenticated-User’) 31 (14%)
Internet Service Provider gateway 24 (11%)
- Internet Service Provider gateway (using ‘Received’) 22 (10%)
- Internet Service Provider gateway (using ‘x-originating-ip’) 3 (1%)
Internet Service Provider* [via ‘ISP gateway’] 23 (10%)
Internet Service Provider address* [via ‘ISP gateway’] 23 10%)
Language (using ‘Accept-Language’, ‘Content-Language’) 157 (70%)
Table 1: Summary of the information that could be gathered from the emails. The term ‘using’ defines
the header tag that allowed the new information to be discovered, while the term ‘via’ defines a secondary
information inference allowed by newly discovered data.
email client such as Outlook or Thunderbird (4 participants), and for a few others, their organisations
did not support Web browser access (6 participants). Below we present highlights from our investigation
into the emails gathered.
From the analysis of the email headers, we were able to discover several pieces of new information
about participants and their enterprises. While a notable amount of disclosures can be expected because
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of how email works (for instance, being able to view the email servers of an organisation that an email
traverses or ‘hops’ through), some of the information found was somewhat surprising. For example, in
a few cases we could identify the participant’s internal company username. In Table 1, we summarise
what information was inferred (about the individual and their organisation) and through which header
tag, across the entire sample of emails. For each, we also present the percentage of emails in which that
inference could be made (i.e., the new information derived).
In the following sections, we discuss the leakages presented in Table 1, both at the individual and the
enterprise level. After this, we then report on our assessment of header tags and the correlation of tags
with particular technologies.
4.2 Information Exposed at an Individual Level
4.2.1 Internal Username
Reflecting on Table 1, there are several areas of particular interest from a security and privacy perspective.
The first, and possibly one of the most concerning, pertains to the exposure of an individual’s internal
username. This piece of information (which we note is typically different to the prefix before the ‘@’
in an email address) was present in 14% of the emails assessed. Although its presence was not at all
substantial, the fact that this is exposed is alarming. This is especially given that it constitutes half of
the information needed to access an employee’s user account, and it could also certainly help launch a
convincing spear-phishing campaign. In terms of the conditions of exposure, from our assessment these
usernames appeared to be exposed mainly because of how the email account was set up on the device.
That is, to authenticate to the outgoing SMTP email server (or simply, to send emails from the device),
this username would need to be provided as a prerequisite to emails being allowed through the system.
This is not uncommon as it helps prevent outgoing servers being abused, but it is somewhat surprising
that the sensitive information such as a username is not removed from onward transmitted emails.
As it pertains to the five types of emails considered, we found that the username tended to be leaked
mostly in emails from mobile phones (33%) and least in emails from browsers (10%). The leakage
via mobiles could be explained by the email setup previously mentioned, while the latter leakage may
be the result of the company system configuration. A general point worth noting here and throughout
the discussion below is that, because there was limited interaction with participants (and as a result of
broad concerns regarding privacy), we were unable to confirm some of the details discovered about their
systems. In some situations therefore, we mention what might be the cause of leakages as opposed to
what was the definite reason.
4.2.2 Email Clients, Device Details and Device IPs
Another notable finding on an individual identity level was the leakage of information about email
clients used, devices from which the emails were sent, and device IPs. For instance, we found that
in 28% of emails, the email client used by the sender was included. This was inferred using the
X-Mailer and User-Agent tags. Take the following header line for example: “X-Mailer: iPhone
Mail (11D257)”. In this X-Mailer tag, we can clearly see that iPhone Mail (with a build number
of 11D257) has sent the email. The User-Agent tag also leaked a reasonable amount of information,
for example, consider this line: “User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86 64; rv:24.0)
Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.2.0”. Here, the email client (Thunderbird) can be identified as
well as its version number (24.2.0). This can also be seen with other clients, for example, the header
line: “User-Agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/14.4.3.140616”; from this, we can easily identify
that Microsoft Outlook for Mac, version 14.4.3.140616, has been used to send the email. From an at-
tacker’s perspective, knowing the version numbers of these clients can be especially advantageous in
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crafting an attack. Take the case of the individuals using Thunderbird/24.2.0 for instance. This is a very
outdated version of Thunderbird (31.0 is current), and more importantly, there are several vulnerabilities
(many critical) that have been openly published regarding it [17].
In addition to its use in identifying email clients, the User-Agent tag was found to be partially useful
(i.e., only in 9% of emails) at indicating the operating system (OS) of the device used by the sender.
In the cases above, there are explicit mentions of iPhone (which is known to run the iOS operating
system), Linux and Mac OS respectively. Two other noteworthy tags where device details tended to
be leaked were in the MIME-Version and Message-ID. An example of the former is “MIME-Version:
1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 7.3 (1878.6))” (i.e., Mac OS X operating system), while an example of the
latter is “Message-ID: <mqfenfoimkeid.873487@email.android.com>” (i.e., suggesting an im-
plementation of the Android OS is in use by the individual).
An interesting point here is that in most cases where the MIME-Version leaked an OS, it was Mac
OS X. In a similar manner, when the Message-ID leaked the OS, the Android OS was mainly mentioned.
Message-ID did also mention Blackberry OS (RIM) a few times, suggesting a potential use of this tag
particularly by mobile devices. From an exposure perspective, the leakage of such device information is
concerning particularly in the first case (i.e., in the MIME-Version tag) because much more information
is available, and it could potentially be used to prepare a targeted attack taking advantage of known
(published) vulnerabilities of the specific system.
Although arguably not as important as a username, the device IP is another crucial piece of informa-
tion (especially if it is public / routable) that was found in the emails assessed. Specifically, the sender’s
device IP was leaked in 35% of emails, most of which leaked their internal address through the Received
and X-Originating-IP tags. An example of such a leakage is: “Received: from [192.168.18.67]
(dhcp.organisati.on [XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX]) by mailserver4.organisati.on (Postfix)
with ESMTPSA”. This tag is the first (from bottom in the email header) and describes the hop from the
network the sender’s device is on, to the organisation’s email server. Considering that this is an internal
IP, there is little real exposure from the sender’s perspective as the IP is not directly reachable (and thus,
able to be easily targeted) by a malicious entity on the Internet. In the case of the three public IPs that
were discovered in our analysis (see Table 1), however, there is no protection, and therefore there is a
real risk to the individual and their employer. For instance, the IP could be scanned for open ports and
then targeted with specific attacks (e.g., to hack into the device, and steal data or upload malware), or
denial-of-service attacks might be launched to render the device unusable.
Reflecting on the leakage of information pertaining to email clients, device information and device
IPs across the five email types, there were no significant unexpected differences in what was leaked.
There are two points worth highlighting nonetheless. First, in the cases where an email was sent from a
dedicated email client, we were able to discover that client’s name from 35% of the emails by considering
only the information explicitly mentioned in the tags. If an email was sent from a browser or mobile
phone however, this leakage could only be seen 21% and 14% of the time respectively. To some extent,
this can be expected given the increasing tendency to include more information about a client software
in tags; this, of course, would not apply to email access using Web browsers. The second point is that
device IP seems to be present slightly more when an email originated from a mobile phone — i.e., the IP
was present in 33% of emails from a mobile phone, but only in 28% of the emails from a desktop client.
This might be explained by the setup of the mobile devices (i.e., needing to authenticate to an SMTP
server to send emails) or how they were connected to the network (e.g., the use of WiFi access points).
4.2.3 Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
From the emails gathered, we were also able to discover information about the Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) used by the individuals; specifically, this was seen in 8% of emails. This information was
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found predominantly in the first hop (i.e., the first Received tag) and was most prevalent in emails
sent from mobile phones. Observe the following as an example: “Received: from XXX.02.net
([XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX]) by mailserver6.organisati.on with esmtpsa (Exim 4.69)”. From
this line of header text, we can find out that the sender was on the “02.net” network, which is operated
by the UK telecommunications company O2. The assumption that could be made therefore, is that O2 is
the individual’s ISP (and possibly mobile phone operator). The main reason why mobile phones tend to
leak this information more is simply because these hops would not be present if an email is sent from a
desktop computer on a corporate network; we did, however, find theses hops in some cases where emails
were sent from laptops on home computer networks.
Although the leakage of this information may not be critical from a privacy standpoint, the impli-
cations of an attacker knowing an individual’s ISP can affect security. Most notably, social-engineering
attacks might be conducted where a threat poses as an employee of O2 (e.g., over email, phone or in per-
son) either to gather more information on the individual or for purposes such as fraud (e.g., requesting a
bill be paid to a new account) [13].
4.2.4 Other Areas of Concern
Another notable finding was that connections to mail servers using IMAP or POP may leak more in-
formation than connections using MAPI (and generally Microsoft Exchange servers with clients using
Microsoft Outlook). More specifically, email connections using the latter tended not to expose details
about the sender’s computer (e.g., IP, name) or network in the first Received hop, but instead, only
recorded the hop between the first two servers (at least one of which, would be running Exchange). Re-
flecting on the risk of exposure because of the presence of this information, the main concern would be
social engineering or spear-phishing attacks. For instance, an attacker might craft an email claiming to
be the person’s ISP and using other intelligence gathered (e.g., name, location, and even device details)
to trick the individual into conducting some action or releasing even more sensitive data.
4.3 Information Exposed at an Organisational Level
4.3.1 Email Server Hostnames and IPs
At the organisation (or employer) level, we were able to find a reasonable amount of information about
how enterprises setup their email systems. This was not indicative of careless deployments but rather
a side-effect of how email and email services (e.g., forwarding, filtering, spam-checking) operate. For
instance, given that email works by using hops between machines to traverse from one network to the
next, in all emails we have been able to identify the hostnames and IPs (internal and external) from the
email servers using the Received header tags.
Using the hostname and IP information, we, as any other message receiver, could then make further
inferences about: (i) the Employer’s name (in 78% of emails) and address (in 76% of emails) using
Whois directories or IP Geo-locator services; (ii) IP versions in use — from the Server IP, it was possible
to detect whether IPv4 and/or IPv6 was in use (IPv6 was seen in 21% of emails); and (iii) Internal
network IP configurations (in 37% of emails), i.e., whether the company’s internal networks are set up
to use 10.*.*.* or 192.168.*.*, and so on. There is also the fact that one could map out a flow of
email traffic through the enterprise by looking at the route that email takes through various organisational
servers. Some of these hops could even indicate internal Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
gateway devices, and the names of WLANs; these were identified in 10% of emails, and usually from the
first or second internal Received hops. All of this information could be useful to an attacker engaged in
intelligence gathering about an enterprise, especially in preparation for highly targeted attack, potentially
even using social engineering.
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4.3.2 Email Server Software and Protocols
From our assessment, we discovered a few other key areas of exposure of the enterprise. One of these
areas was the release of information pertaining to the email software and specific protocols in use by
the servers through which the email passes; this was present in all of the gathered emails. A typi-
cal example of this leakage can be seen in the line: “Received: from bluehalk.organisati.on
([XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX]) by mlserver2.organisati.on with esmtp (Exim 4.72)”. From this,
one can identify that the Extended SMTP (ESMTP) protocol is in use by the mail servers and that the
receiving server is running the Exim mail transfer agent [10], and specifically, an outdated (version 4.8
is current) and thus, potentially vulnerable version (see [9] for published details on Exim vulnerabili-
ties). We might also further infer that a Unix-based operating system is installed on the receiving server
because Exim was created expressly for this platform, and not for systems such as Microsoft Windows.
Another common protocol that was used to transfer email between mail servers was MAPI (or Mes-
saging Application Programming Interface) – this is an interface that is commonly used by Microsoft
Outlook to communicate with a Microsoft Exchange mail service. In those cases, we might therefore
deduce that the receiving server has Exchange, and thus, the Windows operating system. Arguably these
leaks might not be considered that significant from an exposure perspective, however, one way in which
an enterprise may be targeted is by an attacker using the knowledge of email software (e.g., Exim 4.80)
to research or craft dedicated security exploits.
4.3.3 Email Security Systems
Security-related information could also be leaked in email headers. Specifically, in 26% of emails we
were able to discover information related to the Email security software in use by the enterprise. Take this
line for instance, “X-Ironport-AV: E=Sophos; i=""3.56,87,1900""; d=""scan’214,228"";
a=""76:rtetl4724""” (slightly adapted for privacy reasons). Here, we can identify that Cisco IronPort
email and Web security gateway [5] has been deployed in the enterprise, and that the Sophos anti-virus
engine is scanning emails. Moreover, the tag includes the version number of the gateway (via i=3.56),
amongst other details (e.g., file information using d=scan’214,228); Cisco [6] provides additional de-
tails on the parameters of X-Ironport-AV. Other security software identifiable in the emails gathered
include ForeFront (a Microsoft security product), StarScan (a security application from Willow Star-
com), and references to Distributed Checksum Clearing (DCC) systems (commonly used for email spam
filtering).
Another way in which security mechanisms manifested themselves was in the outsourcing of secu-
rity functions such as spam filtering and virus checking. For example, in the header line, “Received:
from mailserver2.organisati.on (XXX.XXX.XXX.XXX) by XXX.messagelabs.com with
AES128-SHA encrypted SMTP”, the sender’s organisation is redirecting its email to messagelabs.com,
which is an email and end-point security service offered by Symantec. Microsoft and Google also
offer similar email services, and those were seen in email forwards to XXX.exchangelabs.com and
XXX.postini.com respectively. At a general level, we noticed outsourcing of email services in 25% of
emails; this spanned both outsourcing for security and general email service hosting and management.
There was no real variation to report in the exposure of identity information across the five email types.
The main concern in exposing such security software details or that email services are outsourced,
would be an attacker using this insight to search for known vulnerabilities which might then be exploited.
Similar to the email software example from the previous paragraph, this could be as straightforward as
searching online for an exploit to the software’s specific version, or using all of the information gathered
as the basis for a social-engineering attack to gather even more insight (e.g., posing as a Microsoft
Exchange Labs employee to the organisation to discover more about their systems).
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4.4 Identifying the Technologies of Email Senders based on Basic Header Tags
In addition to examining email headers for obvious leakage of potentially sensitive information, we also
were interested in investigating header tags for any correlation with particular technologies. Unlike the
two sections above, this assessment was more focused on the presence and absence of tags themselves
(rather than on their values) and what that might leak about the technology being used by the message
sender. For instance, if an individual is emailing from AppleMail (on an Apple Mac), are there certain
header tags that are more likely to be present than if they were emailing from Outlook? The main
difference to the work above is that we are not relying only on explicit mentions of technologies to
identify what those technologies are.
For this assessment, we adopted a simple approach where we divided the set of emails into categories
according to the technology used by the email sender. We focused on two areas, desktop email clients and
emails from smartphones. Next, we grouped the emails from the same clients together, and those from
the same phones together. There were three desktop clients, namely Microsoft Outlook (Windows/Mac),
AppleMail and Thunderbird, and four types of smartphones, i.e., iPhone, Android-based, Blackberry
and Windows-based (for smartphones, emails were predominately sent from the native email apps).
After creating the groups, we then analysed the presence and absence of all header tags across the emails
and noted the percentage of emails within each group with the tag present. To ensure that the tags were
generated by the clients and not the mail servers, we considered and removed that tags that were present
when the email was sent from the participant’s respective Web-mail interface.
Figure 3: Examining the presence of six header tags according to the email client technology used
From the analysis of percentages, there were several intriguing findings. To start with the email
clients, it was found that the there was a marked difference in the presence of some tags as highlighted
in Figure 3. For instance, Accept-Language, Content-Language, Thread-Index and Thread-Topic were
much more likely to be present in emails sent from Outlook than those sent from AppleMail or Thunder-
bird. In the case of Outlook and Thunderbird, 97% of emails sent from Outlook had a Content-Language
header tag while 0% from Thunderbird included the tag. AppleMail could be distinguished from Out-
look and Thunderbird through its persistent inclusion of the X-Mailer tag; this tag was found in 71% of
AppleMail emails but only in 1% and 0% of Outlook and Thunderbird emails respectively. With respect
to Thunderbird, the main differentiator between it and the other clients was the User-Agent tag. This
was present in all of the emails sent from Thunderbird but just 1% of emails from Outlook and none of
the emails from the AppleMail client. From this high-level assessment, we can already conclude that it
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is possible to make intelligent assertions about the email clients in use by senders using the most basic
of tag information. To properly examine this further however, and know whether it is truly feasible, one
would need a large amount of header data and correlational detail.
Distinguishing smartphones based on basic tags was a considerably more challenging task. Although
there were four types to assess, the Blackberry and Windows-based devices were poorly represented
(only 5 emails in total) which led to their data not being substantial enough to thoroughly compare
with iPhone and Android. In terms of the iPhone and Android comparison, the main finding as shown in
Figure 4, was that iPhone tended to use X-Mailer, Content-ID and Content-Transfer-Encoding noticeably
more. For example, Content-Transfer-Encoding was present in 100% of iPhone emails but just 64% of
Android emails. While this is a useful finding, 64% is still a noteworthy amount and given that our
sample size is not that large, this finding should be relied upon with caution. Such caution should also
be applied to the other two header tags. To comment briefly on emails sent from Blackberry devices, one
conclusion, albeit insignificant for reasons mentioned prior, is that these devices appear to always have
tags for Accept-Language, Content-Language, Content-Transfer-Encoding, Thread-Index and Thread-
Topic. Together, therefore, these tags could potentially be used to distinguish Blackberry devices from
other types of devices; this, of course, assumes that our initial observation holds true for all of these
smartphones.
Figure 4: Examining the presence of three header tags according to the type of smartphone used
In addition to the findings above, there were a few other points worthy of attention. The first is the
fact that the tag-value combination “Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"” seems
to mostly be present in emails sent from an iPhone (default client) or AppleMail client; in 70% of emails
with that tag, this was the case. Content-Type was also useful in identifying other users. For instance, we
found that the tag “Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-1"; format=flowed”
only occurred with Thunderbird users on Linux. Although not as telling, we were also able to identify
situations were systems were not in use. Two cases of such are demonstrated with the header tag-value
combinations: “Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit” and “Content-Transfer-Encoding:
quoted-printable”. In the former case, we found that this combination only appeared to be included
in emails not originating from the Windows operating system. In the latter case, none of the emails with
this tag were from an Android-based device. Of course, there needs to be some caution with relying on
these “not in use” results in particular given that the size of our sample could have affected our coverage
of these individual groups.
To briefly summarise the findings in this section, we have demonstrated that it is possible, to some
extent, to characterise types of technologies used (or not used) by email senders based only on basic
header information. Although our results are mainly exploratory at this stage and by no means definitive,
they shed further light on the real issues associated with inadvertent information leakage. If a deter-
mined attacker were able to gather enough information from a wide variety of clients and email systems,
techniques such as supervised machine learning could easily be applied to mine for useful correlations.
From this, a predictive model could be developed to determine the systems and software in use by an
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email sender based on just basic header information and no explicit leakage of technology names. This
knowledge could be used in combination with the techniques in previous sections to gather insight as a
platform for an attack.
5 Reflection and Recommendations
Reflecting on the goal of this research and the experiment’s findings discussed above, we can clearly see
evidence of potentially sensitive information being exposed in email headers. This includes information
about the individual (e.g., usernames, devices used, and ISPs) and the organisation that they work for
(e.g., email server details, email software used, and to some extent, internal network configurations).
To comment on the overall experiment, there was not as much exposure across the participants as we
had imagined or was found in our exploratory pilot studies. For example, in only 28% of emails could
we explicitly (via information in tags) identify the email client used, and in merely 14% of emails were
we able to discover a username. One reason for this could be the fact that our sample was not sufficiently
diverse, and that the (good) practices of the organisations studied influenced our findings. There is, of
course, also the possibility that leakage is not widespread and only happens in a few situations – the
best-case scenario. Either way, we were able to infer pieces of sensitive information about individuals
and organisations in our study that could be used as a platform for further attacks. This, therefore, does
highlight some worrying level of exposure, albeit not tremendous.
Critically speaking, the real concern with the leakage found is the fact that a noteworthy portion
of this information, especially information about a company’s internal systems, is otherwise difficult
for an attacker to obtain. Email headers, therefore, provide a valuable reconnaissance technique and
only require a single, unsuspecting individual within a company to send an email to the attacker. The
information gathered could then be used to research and target exploits in the company’s software or
used as a basis for a social-engineering attack to gather more actionable intelligence about the individual
or enterprise.
In terms of protective strategies against such leakages, we strongly recommend that enterprises and
individuals: (i) conduct an audit of what they may be exposing via their email headers; and (ii) if possible,
aim to remove or redact any information that might be sensitive or used for nefarious purposes. In this
paper we have provided a detailed example of the types of information that could result in an increased
exposure to risk, both to privacy and to security. Another, more drastic option to avoid the leakage of
information is to synthesize email headers. Therefore, instead of exposing sensitive details, misleading
information could be included in sent emails. This option may be appealing to certain high-security
companies or industries such as defence. One significant issue that protective approaches which seek to
remove or synthesize headers will need to tackle is that of Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) setups. This
could require changes in enterprise policy or deployment of specialised device clients (or extensions) that
can ensure that all possible avenues of information leakage have been addressed.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The dominant use of emails as a form of communication for companies and organisations has opened
the door to a range of potential attacks. Although much effort thus far has been dedicated to preventing
attacks originating from incoming emails, there is a significant security problem regarding the disclosure
of potentially sensitive information in email headers. The research in this paper specifically concentrates
on the information that can be leaked by email headers to detect the extent that it occurs, where and when
it tends to happen, and how it can affect the security and privacy of an individual or an organisation.
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As our study has demonstrated, there exists a real and present risk of information disclosure within
email headers. Although this inadvertent leakage was not as significant as we had worried might be
the case, the information discovered could still be used for a number of malevolent purposes by an
attacker. These range from intelligence-gathering activities as a preparation for large-scale attacks on an
enterprise, to social-engineering attacks focused on more easy and quick targets. Our recommendation to
enterprises and individuals to preserve their privacy and reduce risk exposure is to remove overly verbose
tags such as X-Mailer and User-Agent and redact any technology-specific information not required by
transmitting servers or the message receiver.
There are two main avenues that we are exploring for future work. The first is a broader study involv-
ing a larger participant cohort and a range of industries (security-focused and otherwise). This would
serve to confirm the findings in this study and also to identify any additional information leaks not en-
countered previously. We would be especially interested using this larger dataset to look for correlations
in email clients or devices, and the presence and absence of certain header tags. The second area that we
aim to engage in future work on is that of tools to understand where information leaks occur. Specifically,
we will aim to develop a set of plug-ins for email systems that would allow individuals to assess whether
they expose any information, and if they do, the types of attacks that might be launched against them. We
are also considering ways in which information can be safely redacted without affecting performance,
and how this can be integrated into existing email systems. Addresses these areas of future work will be
essential in ensuring the privacy and security of the systems and data of enterprises and individuals.
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